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98.8%! Is project failure acceptable? 
 
Abstract  
Project management is in crisis; albeit largely unrecognized and unacknowledged. 
This crisis manifests itself in the continued poor performance of projects with a 
significant percentage, maybe as high as 98.8% (The Standish Group, 2014b), 
failing to deliver beneficial change. Until this crisis is dissolved projects will not 
produce the powerful results they are capable of.  
In this paper the author will examine three reviews of project failure and argue that 
these reviews do not address the root causes of project failure and that a focus on 
cost and time is a cause of project failure and the lists of causes are in fact 
symptoms of this singular perspective.  












98.8%! Is project failure acceptable? 
 
Introduction 
Recent research by The Standish Group found that 98.8% of the projects in its 
database, 50,000 in total, failed when measured against six criteria; cost, time, 
value, scope, customer satisfaction and strategic objectives. Given this level of 
failure projects are failing to unleash the power which they potentially should. 
This paper will examine three investigations into project failure; those by The 
Standish Group who produce the Chaos Report, Nelson’s retrospectives at the 
University of West Virginia and Flyvbjerg et. al and their review of mega projects. It 
will be argued that these reviews take a singular view of projects based on a project 
definition which utilises a very narrow boundary and that the findings are actually 
symptoms of a focus on delivering an output to cost and time targets, “two best 
guesses and a phenomenon”  (Atkinson, 1999) 
In concluding a way forward to improve project performance is proposed with an 
emphasis on delivering benefits and educating project staff so they gain an 
understanding of the activities needed to deliver projects successfully.  
Projects have been carried out throughout human history as ways of realising ideas, 
(Haynes, 1996; Kozak-Holland, 2011; Lenfle & Loch, 2010; Morris, 2013) for 
example: the construction of the Pyramids, Stonehenge, the medieval cathedrals, 
numerous wars, the Manhattan project as well as smaller ideas such as cooking and 
consuming a meal.  
A number of authors suggest that project management as currently understood was 
formalised in the 1960s as the Project Management Associations (PMA) became 
established and Bodies of Knowledge (BoK) written which have been iterated over 
time. (Haynes, 1996; Lenfle & Loch, 2010; Morris, 2013; Zhichang, 2007). 
The term project manager was first used by the Harvard Business Review in 1959 by 
Paul Gaddis, (Zhichang, 2007, p. 60) and in the 1960s PMAs started to be 
incorporated bringing competence requirements, bodies of knowledge and 
certifications. There are currently in excess of 750,000 people certified as project 
managers holding the PMAs  (APM, 2011; IPMA, 2011; Project Management 
Institute, 2013) and PRINCE2 (Groult, 2011) qualifications alone. Notwithstanding 
these efforts to formalise professional standards, projects are still failing with 
depressing regularity. (Dalcher, 2003; Kapsali, 2013; Ministry of Defence, 2010; The 
Standish Group, 2009) Indeed, it is staggering that so many certified people can 
produce so much failure and that this situation has developed without challenge.  
Projects have been defined in many ways but most authorities (e.g. Cooke-Davies, 
2000, p. 19; Turner, 2008, p. 2) suggest three common characteristics: shared 
objectives; activities that require management; and a defined start and finish time. 
Definitions of project management tend to emphasise cost, time and quality as   
Atkinson (1999, p. 338); Cooke-Davies (2000, p. 19) show in their work. PRINCE2 
defines a project as “a temporary organisation that is created for the purpose of 
delivering one or more business products according to an agreed Business Case.” 
(Office of Government Commerce, 2009), a definition the author suggests is limiting 
and potentially a cause of project failure due to its singular viewpoint and focus on a 
project output rather than the realisation of benefits. Turner (2008, p. 2) adds the 
important dimension of benefits and offers a simplified definition by stating ‘A project 
is a temporary organization to which resources are assigned to do work to deliver 
beneficial change.’ This definition stresses benefits rather than outputs. 
One common factor is the temporary nature of a project and it is common to recruit 
project managers specifically to deliver an output such as a product, with them 
having no input to the initiative or benefit realisation phases. This is a situation that I 
argue militates against project success when measured against the criterion of 
beneficial change. I suggest a different world view of projects which emphases the 
realisation of benefits and the importance of the project manager being involved in 
the value creation of the project and working closely with the business change 
manager who is responsible for realising the benefits. A further property of a project 
is its uniqueness. Regardless of whether a similar project has been completed each 
project will be executed in a different environment, with different stakeholders by 
different people yet the Project Management Associations and APMG International, 
the global certification body for PRINCE2,  suggest a standardised approach will 




Project success has historically been measured against the triple constraints of cost, 
time, and quality; often referred to as the iron triangle. (Atkinson, 1999; Cooke-
Davies, 2000; Ika, 2009; Jenner, 2011; Morris, 1998) Quality may mean meeting 
technical specifications; however, quality is a subjective concept and will depend 
upon the perspective of the judge. (Ika, 2009, p. 8). Using these criteria means that 
cost and time become targets rather than constraints and leads the project 
management team onto a focus on achieving those targets instead of the beneficial 
change the organisation commissioned the project to realise. 
As  shown in the next sections both the UK and USA governments are mandating 
that projects be monitored against time, cost, and quality; criteria, it is suggested, 
that are no more than best guesses and a phenomenon (Atkinson, 1999, p. 340). 
The effect of this is to narrow the thinking of project personnel and focus attention 
away from project purpose. It is therefore no surprise that projects fail to deliver the 
beneficial change detailed in the business case if indeed it is even in the business 
case. This focus on, especially, cost and time can mean that other activities and 
events are missed due to “inattentional blindness.”  (Chabris, Weinberger, Fontaine, 
& Simons, 2011, p. 150) For instance a focus on activity scheduling may lead to an 
underestimation of the importance of, say, chopping down more trees than agreed to 
a group of residents, leading to these residents becoming upset and reactive actions 
being taken adding to the project’s costs. If project board meetings concentrate on 
discussing cost and time issues, the tracking of benefits realisation or risks may be 
skimmed over or totally omitted. Counter intuitively concentrating on cost and time 
can lead to these parameters increasing due to the oversight of other project 
elements. Delivering a project to cost and time often is the success criteria and as 
such becomes the target especially for the project manager who will rarely be 
involved when the benefits are being realised. Seddon (2005, 2008) has highlighted 
the folly of turning measures into targets. 
The Calleam Consulting Ltd., web site details a number of project failures both global 
and across all sectors and gives a flavour of project failure over the last decade or 
so. (Calleam Consulting Ltd, 2014) and below are detailed a number of failures from 
the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK). 
In the United States of America for example there were the problems that dogged 
the project to develop a virtual case file system for the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) in 2005 (Chua, 2009, p. 34; Friden, 2005; Martin, 2010) and the 
fiasco of the Denver Airport baggage handling system (Lukaitis & Cybulski, 2004; 
Mathiassen & Nielsen, 2008; Shore, 2008; Van De Ven & Johnson, 2006, p. 33). 
Shore (2008); 2009, p. 6) lists a number of projects across sectors in the USA that 
have failed, including Viewtron in the 1980s, Chrysler’s merger with Fiat in 2009, 
Airbus 380, the New York City police communications system, and  the BP oil spill in 
the Gulf of Mexico in 2010.  
Worthen (2002) relates how Nestle’s first foray into development of an Enterprise 
Resource Planning system proved impossible to implement successfully, resulting in 
the company’s decision to scrap the new system after two years work and begin the 
project over again.  
In the UK, similarly poor outcomes are widespread. In the project to build a new Air 
Traffic Control center, which was ten years over schedule and still required 
numerous reworks a year after opening (McKelvey, 2006). The infamous National 
Health Service (NHS) IT project, similarly ten years over schedule, was finally 
scrapped after expenditure of some £12 billion in September 2011, when it was 
announced that individual hospitals could choose their own preferred solutions 
(Information Age, 2011). In 2014 the e-borders project was finally scrapped at a cost 
of £224m (Glick, 2014).  
The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC, 2004, 2005) report the Child Support 
Agency’s failures to meet the requirements of its stakeholders and consequent 
failure to deliver any of the expected benefits. The BBC itself is not immune as the 
failure of the Digital Media Initiative shows, and this quote from the Director General 
"’I have serious concerns about how we managed this project,’ BBC director general 
Tony Hall said.” seems somewhat understated given the waste of nearly £100m of 
taxpayers money. (BBC, 2013). Further UK public sector failures include the shared 
back office service for the Research Councils (eGov monitor, 2011) NHS’s National 
Programme for Information Technology (Public Service, 2011a) and FiReControl 
(Computing, 2011). Additionally (Public Service, 2011b) reported an ICT system for 
the Police was ‘detrimental to crime prevention.’  These failures are not limited to the 
public sector, as Haskett (2011) article about Boeing’s Dreamliner project 
demonstrates. There are many more examples from the decades prior to the 2000s 
(e.g.Dalcher, 1999) and the concern has to be why projects continue to fail with such 
regularity, notwithstanding the introduction of legislative and mandatory requirements 
for government projects in both the USA and UK. 
The Standish Group (2009) define project success in terms of time, cost, and quality 
requirements, known as the ‘iron triangle’, and state that an unfinished project 
constitutes a failure. This definition ignores that closing a project early, and thus 
preventing further unproductive spend, is often a sign of mature project 
management. In recommending the stopping of a project, the author saved an 
organization over £4M, which was able to be used elsewhere more beneficially. It 
was successfully argued that completion of this project would represent very poor 
return on investment (ROI). In a constantly changing organisational environment, a 
decision to cancel a project that is no longer likely to deliver beneficial outcomes 
should be applauded as a success. The Standish Group definition neglects to take 
into account the realisation of benefits from the project, as advocated by (Bradley, 
2006; Jenner, 2010, 2011) and (Kerzner & Saladis, 2009) and also fails to consider 
the ROI from project outcomes.  
 
USA and UK government response 
 
These levels of project failure have led to the governments of both the United States 
of America (USA) and United Kingdom (UK) to legislate or mandate certain 
requirements for the management of projects.   
The USA Government has introduced legislation, the Information Technology 
Management Reform Act of 1996 known as the Cohen-Clinger Act, (Levinson, 2008) 
and mandated the use of Earned Value Management (EVM) in its project delivery in 
an attempt to stem the flow of project failures (United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2009, p. 2). Some 12 years later further legislation was 
proposed; the Information Technology Investment Oversight Enhancement and 
Waste Prevention Act of 2008 (Levinson, 2008), this was not enacted. However, in 
2009 another attempt at enacting this legislation was passed by the US Senate 
although it met with failure in the House of Representatives. (Govtrack.us, 2010)  
The UK government has widely adopted PRINCE2 as the de facto standard since 
the 1990s (Office of Government Commerce, 2008), and, in April 2011, the UK 
government introduced the Major Projects Authority (MPA) (Cabinet Office, 
2011b).The Cabinet Office Minister, Francis Maude, is reported as saying ‘This 
Government will not allow costly failure of major projects to continue. That’s why we 
have set up the Major Projects Authority – to work in collaboration with central 
Government Departments to help us get firmer control of our major projects, and 
ensure there is a more systematic approach by departments as well as regular, 
planned scrutiny to keep projects on track.’ (McNiff & Whitehead, 2002) 
The Minister appears to believe that by doing the same things with greater rigour and 
resolve a different outcome will be achieved. This is the very definition of insanity 
according to Narcotics Anonymous (1981, p. 11), albeit a quote frequently attributed 
to Einstein. The minister’s view is not universally shared as Marchand and Hykes 
(2006) for instance, describe a case in which a Customer Relationship Management 
(CRM) system development in a global industrial products group was lauded as a 
success, as it came in on time and within budget. But no sooner had the project 
team finished congratulating themselves on a job well-done, than the company’s 
auditors pointed out that, in their opinion, it was a failure – few people were actually 
using the system to carry out their work. In the light of such reports, the following 
sections will explore the nature of projects and the underlying bases of Earned Value 
Management (EVM) and PRINCE2. It is suggested that these approaches focus the 
attention of project personnel on cost and time to the detriment of benefits realisation 
and other activities required to deliver a project successfully. Training in this area will 
also be explored with its emphasis on certification through either project 
management associations or PRINCE2 that is manifestly failing to stem the flow of 
poor project performance. It is clear that projects are failing notwithstanding the 
professional training of those charged with the responsibility to manage them. 
The next sections will consider in more detail the United Kingdom (UK) Government 
response to these widespread project failures, and then examine some literature to 
explore the reasons for project failure. 
 
UK government response 
 
The United Kingdom Government’s initial response to the high incidence of reported 
failure in public sector projects was to mandate the use of PRINCE (now replaced by 
PRINCE2), as stated on the Office of Government Commerce Web site in 2008. 
PRINCE (which stands for Projects in Controlled Environments) was first developed 
by the UK Government in 1989 as a standard approach to IT project management 
for central government. This methodology it is claimed has been widely adopted for 
projects in both the public and private sectors. The APMG International Ltd. (2007) 
states ‘PRINCE2 is a de facto standard developed and used extensively by the UK 
government and is widely recognised and used in the private sector, both in the UK 
and internationally. It embodies established and proven best practice in project 
management.’ This description is inaccurate; firstly PRINCE2 is a methodology not a 
standard and does not fully meet the requirements of ISO 21500 nor BSI 6079 which 
are the standards for project management. The second issue relates to best 
practice; As argued by Kurtz and Snowden (2003) best practice works well in areas 
of certainty and agreement on the action(s) to take, in volatile, uncertain, complex 
and ambiguous environments, such as projects, it has less applicability and a more 
adaptive approach is required. 
However despite there being in excess of 262,000 PRINCE2 practitioners (Groult, 
2011) projects are still failing across all sectors according to research by The 
Standish Group (The Standish Group, 2009) and the UK’s National Audit Office 
(NAO) (National Audit Office, 2010) amongst many. 
PRINCE2 provides a structured approach, setting out responsibilities for specified 
roles. There is a requirement to review the business case on a regular basis to 
ensure its continued validity. Nonetheless, it is common for projects to continue well 
beyond the time when the validity of the business case has been lost. The basic 
concept is of management by exception, using highlight reports to a project board to 
monitor progress on a regular basis with stage approvals as required. Interestingly, 
those highlight report templates that have been seen by the author have spaces for 
progress against cost and plan, but no spaces for reporting how the realisation of 
benefits is proceeding. In addition to PRINCE2, the UK Government has employed a 
six-stage gateway process to control and manage projects. This adds considerable 
overhead, as the project team is required to produce documents relating to the 
project and attend a series of interviews. The individual gateway can be for 3 to 4 
days, involving a team of three reviewers. This process is similar to the now 
discredited Audit Commission inspections. 
Notwithstanding these mandated requirements, projects in the public sector continue 
to fail spectacularly as shown in the examples described above. These continued 
failures have led the UK government to introduce the Major Projects Authority 
(Cabinet Office, 2011b) with effect from 1 April 2011. This is designed to manage 
high value projects in excess of £1billion, those of high complexity or innovative 
projects. It is intended as an improved assurance system for high risk projects (Steel, 
Summersgill, & Band, 2010) and comprises a number of review points for these 
projects (Cabinet Office, 2011a). These reviews take place at pre-determined 
stages, supplemented with annual reviews and quarterly updates. Given the 
frequency of these reviews, and from personal experience, it is estimated that this 
mechanism would take one person at least 53 weeks to complete, which will lead to 
both cost and time overruns if not built in to plans. 
Steel et al. (2010, p. 11) detail the guiding principles and list the controls which 
should be assured; 
1. Time – variance against milestones; 
2. Cost  – variance against planned budget; 
3. Quality – degrees off the quality target; 
4. Scope – variance agreed against what will be delivered; 
5. Risk – limits on identified risks as a percentage of the overall budget; 
6. Benefit – variance against level of benefit identified as part of the business 
justification  
The reader will note that the iron triangle leads the way, ahead of the desired 
benefits that are the reason for the project to be undertaken! This focus takes the 
importance away from project purpose onto project efficiency which with the 
PRINCE2 definition stressing products leads to sub-optimisation of the whole 
system. Reaching the project milestones within planned budget becomes the target 
for all concerned. It is the author’s contention that this concentration on the twin 
targets of time and cost are a significant contribution to project failure. It is not 
advocated that cost and time constraints be ignored, however, there is too much 
emphasis placed on these constraints to the detriment of delivering maximal return 
on investment. Frustratingly, the UK Government have seen the results of mandating 
PRINCE2 and imposing a formal gateway process, and noted how projects have 
failed in this environment, and the response has been to impose still more of the 
same. This appears to be a clear case of ‘doing the wrong thing righter’, by 
committing more effort and resource to management activities already shown to be 
unproductive. 
The Major Projects Authority has again mandated the use of PRINCE2 and MSP 
(Cabinet Office, 2011a). This means that, in theory at least; someone could attend a 
week’s training, successfully pass the PRINCE2 Practitioner examination, and then 
be appointed project manager for a £1billion + project.  
It was announced on 7 February 2012 that the Said Business School at Oxford 
University will design and host the Major Projects Leadership Academy (MPLA). The 
aim of this initiative is to develop a cadre of world-class major project leaders within 
the UK Civil Service (Oxford University, 2012). The UK government is clearly 
concentrating its efforts to improve project management performance by increasing 
the focus on the cost and time constraints. Fowler and Lock (2006, p. 110) state that 
this approach “… seeks to control costs...is attempting in vain to manage the project 
costs whilst losing sight of the need to manage the project benefits.” 
The UK government have approved a project to build a high-speed rail system, 
known as High Speed 2 (HS2), linking London to Birmingham and then Manchester 
and Leeds in subsequent years. A number of critics of the scheme, including 
(Rudkin, 2012) and (Aizlewood & Wellings, 2012), suggest that there will be limited 
benefits from this project and a poor return on investment. It will be subject to the 
Major Projects Authority remit. However, with the first phase due to be completed in 
2026, we will have to wait a long time to assess the extent of the success or failure 
of this particular project. The earlier HS1 rail system, connecting the Channel Tunnel 
with London, was 18% over budget and 11 months late on time. More relevantly, the 
benefits realised have not been assessed to date and a report states that the 
benefits expected were over optimistic in preparing the business case, “The HS1 
project has delivered a high performing line, which was subsequently sold in a well-
managed way. But international passenger numbers are falling far short of forecasts 
and the project costs exceed the value of journey time saving benefits.” and “The 
High Speed 1 project has brought a number of significant benefits including quicker 
journey for passengers. However, the project went forward on the basis of hugely 
optimistic assumptions about international passenger numbers. These were not 
realised and the Department is only now developing its plan to evaluate whether the 
project was value for money." (National Audit Office, 2012). It seems that the advice 
given in HM Treasury’s Green Book, (H M Treasury, 2003, p. 85) on optimism bias, 
has been ignored, again. That optimism bias is still an issue for the UK government 
is evidenced by the National Audit Office producing a guide in December 2013 
entitled “Over-optimism in government projects” (National Audit Office, 2013) 
The response by the UK government to project failure extends to local government 
also with a belief that PRINCE2 practitioners, control processes, and compliance 
training will ensure project success. Sadly, the results show otherwise and yet, still 
the “bigger hammer” (Senge, 2006, p. 61) is applied.  
Senge (2006, p. 61) suggests that ‘We all find comfort applying familiar solutions to 
problems, sticking to what we know best’. He goes on to describe this as ‘…what we 
need here is a bigger hammer’ syndrome. The bigger hammer is capable of being 
interpreted in different ways; firstly an ever increasing level of control, compliance 
and systematic reviews. Secondly Maslow’s view “I suppose it is tempting, if the only 
tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.”  (Maslow, 1962). 
There are also different hammers and different nails; a sledgehammer would not be 
appropriate to use for hammering a picture nail into a wall. Both the USA and UK 
Governments have designed solutions to project failure that focus on addressing the 
same factors with greater rigour suggesting they only believe they have a hammer in 
their toolbox. Even when the introductions of PRINCE2 in the UK and EVM in the 
USA produced negligible improvement, both governments prescribed more of the 
same. Despite all the evidence showing that a prescriptive bureaucratic process of 
control, believed to be best practice (Eveleens & Verhoef, 2008, p. 30), leads to 
project failure, both the USA and UK governments continue to insist upon ‘a bigger 
hammer’ as a solution. Not surprisingly, projects still fail to provide good return on 
public investment, as well as missing planned budget and time constraints.  
Meadows (2009 p. 140) in describing system traps, discusses a phenomenon of 
seeking for the wrong goal: ‘If the goals – the indicators of satisfaction of the rules –
are defined inaccurately or incompletely, the system may obediently work to produce 
a result that is not really intended or wanted.’ However, it is unhelpful that the project 
management literature tends to concentrate on time, budget, and quality, as criteria 
of project success. Without a deeper investigation, it becomes easy for governments 
to prescribe methods that only deal with the symptoms of failure to meet cost and 
time targets. Such measures do not address causes, and it is therefore no surprise 
that expected benefits of projects continue to be elusive. Furthermore, this problem 
has been recognised in the project management community for many years. 
Shenhar, Milosevic, Dvir, and Thamhain (2007, p. 702) comment: ‘This operational 
mindset is clearly reflected in the project management literature, which has 
traditionally used time, budget, and performance as the main indicators for project 
success. Any of these measures—or even all taken together—can lead to 
incomplete and misleading assessment.’  
As discussed, projects have for many years been defined in terms of cost, time and 
quality – often called the iron triangle. Cost and time are easily measurably 
throughout the life of the project. However, frequently, quality will not be measurable 
until the final project output is delivered. The result is that cost and time become the 
primary measures of project success with no consideration given to the realisation of 
benefits. Both governments’ insistence on targeting cost and time is an example of 
seeking the wrong goals. As a Ugandan proverb aptly suggests: ‘He who hunts two 
rats, catches none’ (Special Dictionary, 2005).The UK and USA governments, by 
focussing on the twin measures of cost and time, turn these measures into targets 
and deflect attention from the purpose of the project onto these targets. Seddon 
(2005, 2008) and The Scotsman (2012) provide a number of examples of targets as 
set by the UK government producing unexpected and inappropriate results. 
In the following sections the reasons for project failure are examined by investigating 
three authorities. Firstly The CHAOS report (The Standish Group, 1996, 1999, 2009) 
which is widely cited and has been produced since 1995.  Secondly  (Nelson, 2005, 
2007) examines 99 project failures in both the USA and UK across the public and 
private sectors. Thirdly, I look into Flyvbjerg and his colleagues’ research into 
megaprojects. These three views are not exclusive, as the literature is extensive in 
reviewing reasons for project failure, however they do represent the main findings. 
Flyvbjerg is The Director of Oxford's BT Centre for Major Programme Management, 
where the Major Projects Leadership Academy is established, which makes his 
views on project failure important for public sector projects in the UK.   The main 
conclusion from this review is that project failure is systemic and poorly understood; 
only symptoms or first order causes are considered. This I argue means an inchoate 
appreciation of the problem and consequently any treatment is likely to fail. The 
proposals to improve project performance only resolve the issue not dissolve it. 
(Ackoff, 1994). 
 
The CHAOS report 
 
The Standish Group has been producing its CHAOS report since 1995, reviewing 
what it calls Information Technology (IT) projects. The CHAOS reports are widely 
cited to support project failure and have been used to support claims that software 
development project management is in crisis (Eveleens & Verhoef, 2008, p. 30; 
Glass, 2006, p. 15). The 1999 report (The Standish Group, 1999, p. 2) states failure 
to occur when the project is cancelled before completion, whereas success is 
delivery on time, in budget and with all features. Anything in between these two 
outcomes, they term ‘challenged’.  These definitions, which ignore any benefits, are 
unhelpful and again forces a focus on the triple criteria of cost, time, and quality and 
away from the purpose of the project. Eveleens and Verhoef (2008, p. 30) also take 
issue with these definitions stating “…they’re misleading, one-sided, pervert the 
estimation practice, and result in meaningless figures.” Another issue arises in 
labelling projects as IT projects; and this may in itself be a factor in project failure. 
Bednar (2000, p. 145) points out not only that any new implementation of an 
information system can have a significant impact on the organization in which it is 
situated, but that the need to study organisational change as a result of IS 
development has been recognised since the 1960’s  (Neuman, 2011). Thus, such 
projects do not stand in isolation to the business and are more accurately described 
as an IT element of a project whose purpose is to bring about benefits to the 
business concerned. To call them IT projects isolates them from their real purpose, 
deflects attention from their impact within the organisational environment and does 
not help in creating project success.  
The following table from The CHAOS manifesto 2013 shows the findings from 2004 
to 2012 by The CHAOS report with findings from the 1999 report added in (The 
Standish Group, 1999, p. 2; 2013, p. 1) 
 
 1994 1996 1998 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Successful 16 27 26 29 35 32 37 39 
Failed 31 40 28 18 19 24 21 18 
Challenged 53 33 46 53 46 44 42 43 
Table 1 success rates 1994 - 2012 according to the CHAOS reports. 
 
Whilst this shows an improvement and even given the caveats about the definitions 
the trend is still for more projects to be unsuccessful than completed successfully, 
despite the numbers of certified project managers and following all the advice given 
by The Standish Group. Moreover, these findings do not make allowance for better 
success criteria such as return on investment and realisation of benefits. Figure 1 
below the same data graphically represented. 
  
Figure    A graph of the above data. 
The 1995 CHAOS report (The Standish Group, 1995, p. 9) lists the following five 
reasons for challenged projects: 
1. Lack of User Input;  
2. Incomplete Requirements and Specifications; 
3. Changing Requirements and Specifications;  
4. Lack of Executive Support; 
5. Technology Incompetence.  
The Standish Group (2014a) in its April newsletter states that they have conducted a 
survey of the Standish User Research Forum (SURF) members with a single 
question “what is your definition of success?” Six definitions were provided and these 
with their percentage scores are shown below: 
1. on-budget,  32% 
2. on-time, 30% 
3. on-target (requirements),  26% 
4. on-goal (organizational strategy), 29% 
5. valuable, 52% 
6. satisfied, 41% 
A total of 309 responses were received and each respondent was allowed up to four 
votes. The percentages reflect that the criterion was cast as one of the four votes. In 
addition about 33% of the respondents selected all of the criteria as their definition of 
success and 15% chose on-budget, on-time and on-target; the iron triangle. 
The Standish group then applied the six definitions against the projects in their 
database and only 1.2% would be considered successful leaving 98.8% 
unsuccessful, whereas if the single definition of on-budget was the sole criterion then 
42% of projects in the database would be considered successful, still a significant 
rate of failure. 
Standish User Research Forum (SURF) is a collection of IT executives from various 
user organizations throughout the world. These executives represent a cross section 
of the IT community from different industries, organization sizes, and geographic 
locations (Salipante & Aram, 2003). It is encouraging that valuable and satisfied 
received the highest support in this survey though both are qualitative terms and 
may depend upon an individual’s interpretation. I am taking valuable to mean 
realising benefits and return on investment (ROI) which should be identified during 
the feasibility stage and an evaluation plan produced. 
The newsletter concludes by stating “The Standish Group believes that organizations 
should forget the triple constraints and focus on the value of their project portfolio, 
not individual projects.” 
This is a major change of emphasis for The Standish Group and a more holistic view 
with a clear departure from the Project Management Institute’s position of success 
being measured by conformance to the triple constraint.  
 
Nelson’s analysis of failure (2005, 2007) 
 
(Nelson, 2007, p. 74) lists a number of reasons for project failure garnered by 
undertaking retrospectives of 99 projects in 74 organisations. Students in the 
University of West Virginia Master of Science in the Management of Information 
Technology (MS MIT) degree program conducted these retrospectives 
. The top five are as follows:  
1. Poor estimating or scheduling; this involves scoping the project and 
(Flyvbjerg, Garbuio, & Lovallo, 2009)estimating the time and effort required; 
2. Ineffective stakeholder management; this involves identifying stakeholders 
and their influence and interest in the project and then managing their 
expectations accordingly. 
3. Insufficient risk management; this involves identifying and mitigating anything 
which may impact upon the project. 
4. Insufficient planning; this happens when project managers jump straight into 
delivery.  
5. Short changed quality assurance; this comes about when projects come 
under pressure and as a result testing and training are often cut. 
The top three reasons occurred in half of the projects Nelson’s students investigated. 
(Nelson, 2007, p. 73) All of these reasons are interconnected for example planning 
will be poor if the planner is unable to estimate or fails to discuss with the appropriate 
people what and who are required to complete tasks.  The five reasons listed all may 
occur due to insufficient time allocation and pressure to deliver the output. 
Additionally, if project managers attempt to conduct project activities as a solo 
exercise, rather than involving both the delivery team and project board there will be 
a singular perspective to the project. Producing lists of reasons falls into the first trap 
of non systems thinking, that of reductionism. (Reynolds & Holwell, (2010, p6). 
Nelson (2005, p. 361) believes the “…secret to more successful project 
management…” is “…learning from the past.” A number of retrospectives were 
carried out assessing projects against process-based criteria and outcome based 
criteria. The process-based criteria used were the very familiar triple constraint of 
cost, time, and requirements. The outcome based criteria are; is the output used, did 
it add value to the organisation and did it help prepare the organisation for the future. 
A number of stakeholder groups ranked the criteria in importance to themselves. 
Unsurprisingly different groups had different importance, for example, the project 
manager group rated cost, time, and requirements highly whereas the sponsor and 
management rated value the highest. (Nelson, 2005, p. 365)   The use of two sets of 
three criteria allows for process success and outcome failure, process failure and 
outcome success, success in both and failure in both. Nelson terms process success 
and outcome failure a successful failure, and process failure and outcome success a 
failed success. He states that the NHS has failed to learn from previous project 
failures and predicted the failure of the NHS IT project as mentioned earlier in this 
paper. (Nelson, 2007, p. 70) 
Neither Nelson nor the Standish Group goes on to examine why the reasons to 
which they attribute failure are occurring. There is no attempt to conduct deeper 
examination to uncover second or deeper orders of causality. This failure to go 
beyond first order causes leads directly to the belief that increasing levels of control 
and monitoring are required in order to improve project performance – applying a 
bigger hammer!  
 
Megaprojects (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 2003), 
(Flyvbjerg, 2013, 2014; Gharajedaghi, 2006), (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009) 
and (Flyvbjerg & Budzier, 2011) 
 
In the works by these authors, over 1000 projects were examined to ascertain 
reasons for their failure. In the 2003 book, they claim that there is repeated over 
estimation of benefits and underestimation of costs related to, especially, 
megaprojects sponsored by governments worldwide. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003, p. 47) 
state ‘…the pattern of underestimated costs and overestimated benefits…’ and 
‘…use of deception and lying…’ are root causes for project failure.  This is a constant 
theme throughout these works with the authors stating “The underlying reasons for 
all forecasting errors can usefully be grouped into three categories: 1) delusions or 
honest mistakes; 2) deceptions or strategic manipulation of information or processes 
or 3) bad luck.” (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009) The authors state that bad luck is the frequent 
excuse given by management for a poor outcome, however the authors maintain that 
causes 1 and 2 are more usual. Item 1 relates to unintentional bias as described by 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) whereas item 2 is the basis of Flyvbjerg’s work, which 
he argues is most common. This following comment “Rather it is taken for granted 
that the proposed highway, stadium, dam or rail line is the correct answer to the 
problem, and cost–benefit estimates somehow come out just right” (Gharajedaghi, 
2006, p. 21) also highlights Reynolds and Holwell (2010, p. 6) second trap of non-
systems thinking – dogmatism applying a singular viewpoint. The Green Book (H M 
Treasury, 2003, p. 33) states that ‘There is a demonstrated, systematic, tendency for 
project appraisers to be overly optimistic. This is a worldwide phenomenon that 
affects both the private and public sectors. Many project parameters are affected by 
optimism – appraisers tend to overstate benefits, and understate timings and costs, 
both capital and operational.’ This is known as optimism bias and the authors of the 
Green Book recommend that allowances be made in project estimations and provide 
formulae to use. Clearly, monitoring an unrealistic budget means that failure is 
certain when cost and time are the measures for success. If the budget is 
underestimated, there is every probability that timescales are erroneous also, so that 
no amount of EVM or monitoring against time and cost will ensure that a project is 
ever on track. EVM will predict the outcome of the understatement quickly, leaving a 
choice between stopping the project or increases to the budget and time allocated - 
a failure according to The Standish Group (The Standish Group, 1995, p. 4).  When 
senior managers discover the subterfuge, it is not surprising to find that they 
withdraw support. However, project staff are often demoralised by this, believing this 
to be a general lack of executive support rather than the fault of their overestimation. 
Senior management is left with a choice between continuing, and being pilloried for 
being over budget and time, or stopping and working out excuses for being duped. 
The recent announcement by the UK Government of a high-speed rail link from 
London to Birmingham and thence on to Manchester and Leeds suggests that The 
Green Book and Flyvbjerg have been ignored as the opponents claim the costs are 
understated with the benefits being over stated and double counted.(Aizlewood & 
Wellings, 2012; Rudkin, 2012).  
In Flyvbjerg and Budzier (2011) the authors contend that ‘IT projects’ fail because 
project managers do not make sufficient allowance for high impact, low probability 
risks, which they term ‘black swans’ after (Taleb, 2007). Taleb (2007, p. xviii) 
however, defines black swans as being unpredictable events; whereas risk is often 
predictable and can be mitigated for. Failure to mitigate risk is a failure of planning or 
managing, and is similar to causes identified by both The Chaos Report and Nelson. 
Despite the patterns of under and over estimation identified by Flyvbjerg and his co-
authors, they propose better risk management as a solution. In the later article with 
Budzier, this solution is even more explicit. This is first order analysis with no attempt 
made to understand why the management of risk is poor. This I contend is dealing 
only with first order causality and the deeper underlying causes have not been 
identified.  
The CHAOS report relies on surveys of staff involved in projects; whereas Nelson 
has carried out retrospectives that examined the reasons for project failure in more 
detail.  It is often suggested that lack of executive support is a main reason for 
project failure. However, if this conclusion is based on surveys completed by project 
managers and delivery team personnel, it could be that they are never honest and 
reflective enough to accept blame themselves; for poor planning, for instance.  
The UK and USA governments’ emphasis on all things cost and time-related do not 
help, as the focus moves away from project purpose and vision, and demonstrably 
leads to project failure. The fact that reports of project failure still abound suggests 
that one or more of the following scenarios is occurring: 
1. The reasons for project failure are being ignored (given the perfunctory nature 
of certification training this could be the case). If organisations do not carry out 
project retrospectives (or if they do this, but do not share their learning), this 
will also serve to mask the true reasons for failure.  (Gharajedaghi, 2006, p. 
20) 
2. There is no understanding of the reasons for failure. It is insufficient to state 
that risk management is poor or planning is non-existent. In order to improve 
project performance, we need to find out why this is so. Until this is 
appreciated, projects will continue to underperform. 
3. The reasons are not explored sufficiently so that we are only dealing with first 
order causes. This is a step forward from the two governments’ responses 
that only address symptoms, but will still not deal with the root causes thus 
leading to project failure. 
4. We do not fully understand the nature of projects, or the environment in which 
projects are pursued. There seems to be an assumption by the two 
governments and the project management associations that projects exist in a 
vacuum of order and stability, rather than the volatile environment most 
usually encountered. This leads to a rigidity that hinders good project 
performance.  
Certainly, the foregoing review shows a concentration on first order causes rather 
than asking why these causes are still so commonplace and the approaches by 
governments tend to concentrate attention upon symptoms rather than causes. 
Another factor which is unhelpful is the shopping list approach and the suggestion 
that each of the listed items can be dealt with individually thus leading to project 
success. The reasons in the lists are interconnected and interrelated and cannot be 
dissolved in isolation. Dealing with project failure in this piecemeal fashion inevitably 
leads to continued failure as has been witnessed. 
In addition these reasons for failure are being viewed through the lens of an 
inappropriate if widespread definition of projects; an output delivered against targets 
of cost and time. If the lens is altered to delivering beneficial change then the lists of 
reasons become symptoms of a poor and limiting worldview caused by pursuing the 
targets of cost and time. By making these constraints targets activities such as risk 
management, stakeholder engagement, planning and communication amongst 
others become less important and project failure becomes almost inevitable. 
Ackoff (1994, p. 185) writes “There are four very different ways of dealing with 
problems and messes in the real world.“  These are absolution, resolution, solution, 
and dissolution. The USA and UK governments’ responses to project failure tend 
towards resolution - a quick fix is achieved by dealing with the symptoms only. The 
underlying causes for project failure are not considered nor any attempt made to 
understand them.  Satisficing will lead to the symptoms recurring as more of the 
same is prescribed. This may be, and often is, a starting point for interventions to 
improve project performance. However, there needs to be a greater appreciation 
(Vickers, 1982) for problem dissolution.  
A further point that needs stressing is that failure will be multicausal and will vary in 
its impact and effect. (Bignell & Fortune, 1984, p. 8) The list of reasons given are 
interconnected and interdependent not discrete as suggested in the examples cited 
above. 
A systemic perspective 
In order to expand on the concept of second order causes, let’s turn our attention to 
the suggestion that ‘insufficient planning’ is to blame for failure. Without exploring 
why this occurs, we cannot understand what is behind this reason for failure. There 
are a number of possible causes for insufficient planning: 
1. Lack of knowledge: not understanding why planning is important; 
2. Lack of competence: lacking the skills or experience to plan effectively; 
3. Insufficient time allocated, due to a focus on cost and time targets: 
underestimating how long planning will take (or a combination of the above); 
4. Pressure to ‘get on with it’: senior management and/or stakeholders may be 
pressing to see something happen, planning is invisible unlike delivery 
5. Lack of understanding of need: project purpose may be poorly understood; 
the need to have plans and regular reviews may not be understood. 
It is not claimed that this is a definitive list of causes for insufficient planning. 
However, it  is suggested that questioning what lies behind each of these causes can 
lead to a much more holistic view of causality. Asking ‘why?’ can generate deepened 
understandings, e.g. from ‘Lack of knowledge’ we can extrapolate the following 
second order causes: 
1. The organisation does not value time spent on planning; 
2. Team members do not understand the importance of planning; 
3. Team members lack experience of (the importance of) planning; 
4. Team members have no competence in planning; 
5. Team leader does not know (or consider) who should be involved in planning. 
This is not intended as a definitive list, but it illustrates the point. This approach takes 
into account that real people are involved in the process of managing projects. It 
allows for greater understanding and creation of a more meaningful set of remedies 
that can be applied. This systemic approach also stress that the causes of failure 
may be multiple and will be context specific (Bignell and Fortune, 1994). This leads 
to a level of complexity that cannot be addressed with simplistic remedies. A holistic 
perspective needs to be achieved before any lasting solution can be applied. It is this 
dimension that is missing from both governments’ responses to project failings. 
Many terms are used in connection with projects – e.g. project management, project 
delivery, project governance and project purpose. The author suggests that this may 
lead to a misunderstanding of the nature of projects/management. A systemic view is 
proposed looking at three interacting elements in project context. The first of these is 
purpose – the rationale behind the project that justifies investment of resources. This 
will include outputs, e.g. a school building or new process; outcomes, e.g. a fully 
equipped school with trained staff or staff trained to use the new process; and 
benefits expected from the project delivery, e.g. a school producing well-educated 
pupils who enter the workforce, or improved effectiveness from the new process. 
These benefits may not be achieved for some time after project delivery has finished 
e.g. a project to reduce obesity levels in a city. This element reflects the defining of 
the vision that led to the project’s inception. 
The second of the interacting elements is creation of plans – this involves mapping 
out the activities such as stakeholder engagement and benefits management at a 
high level. Plans will identify who will be involved in the project and establish its 
structure, together with any monitoring arrangements. Often a project charter will be 
drawn up. This establishes responsibility for the activities required.  
Actions are the third element – what must be done to achieve the outcomes and 
benefits required? This aspect breaks down the plans into more detailed schedules 
of activities and will include planning, benefits identification and tracking, risk logging 
and tracking, stakeholder identification and activity, and change management. This 
element will be used to identify the tasks required, the personnel who will carry them 
out, the time needed to perform those tasks and any development needs of the 
team. These are the tactics for achieving the desired outcomes.  
All three elements are wrapped in an appropriate level of: 
Project management – this is the governance and monitoring arrangements put in 
place for project delivery. These may be staged or gated approval processes 
requiring reviews to be carried out at certain pre-determined stages to ensure the 
project continues to deliver the business benefits expected. Co-ordination of all the 
identified activities and tasks, and ensuring any changes are dealt with appropriately 
form part of this process. This is shown graphically in Figure 2. 
  
Figure 2 Systemic view of projects 
It is contended that the first element project purpose is the most important and 
frequently the most neglected area. Project management, as defined above, often 
receives the most attention to the detriment of the other elements. This view is 
supported by (Atkinson, 1999, p. 340) who states ‘After 50 years it appears that the 
definitions for project management continue to include a limited set of success 
criteria, namely the Iron Triangle, cost, time and quality.’ Additionally, Kerzner and 
Saladis (2009, p. 7) offer the view that ‘decision making based entirely on the triple 
constraint, with little regard for the final value of the project, may result in extreme 
stakeholder dissatisfaction or significant opportunity cost.’ (Jenner, 2011) also 
emphasises the need for benefits to be identified and realised for true project 
success. A further issue is that an undue concentration on time and cost means that 
strategic focus is lost and projects are delivered tactically.  (Shenhar et al., 2007) 
state: ‘As such, it (project management) needs to be integrated into corporate 
strategy and not relegated to the tactical arena.’ 
It is further believed that project methodologies and bodies of knowledge that 
emphasise a linear A to Z progression tend to over-simplify projects, leading to 
inadequate understanding of their problematic nature, made up of any number of 
unknowns and unknowables. Project management is often viewed in isolation from 
other systems within the organisation. As Ackoff (1994, p. 184) states ‘Therefore, 
problems should be viewed from as many different perspectives as possible before a 
way of treating them is selected. The best way often involves collaboration of 
multiple points of view, a transdisciplinary point of view.’ This requires an exploration 
of all the elements of a project, rather than a rush to project delivery and a belief that 
rigorous project management alone will ensure the success of any project.  
The author suggests that the USA and UK governments encourage a limited and 
narrow boundary in considering projects, focussing on the project management 
element to the exclusion of other considerations. This leads them to prescribe 
methods in a frequently vain attempt to control cost and time, turning these resource 
constraints into targets to be met with failure becoming inevitable. 
I propose that the boundary around projects be extended so that the root causes of 
failure can be explored. Until this understanding is achieved, it is unlikely that any 
solution to the issue of poor project performance which so bedevils the USA and UK 
government sectors will be found. (Checkland, 1999) points out that a human activity 
system, such as a project, can best be seen as a mental construct created in the 
mind of an observer. Meadows (2009 pp. 98 - 99) writes ‘We get attached to the 
boundaries our minds happen to be accustomed to’ and ‘…boundaries are of our 
own making...’  (Ulrich, 2005) introduces a concept of boundary critique ‘a systematic 
effort of handling boundary judgments critically.’ In the absence of such a critical 
view, we fear that the catalogue of failure will continue. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion I contend that the USA and UK governments’ responses to project 
failure as evidenced by cost and time overruns are built on a number of false 
assumptions and fail to address, or comprehend, the real causes of poor project 
performance. In this section these assumptions are examined and finally a possible 
way forward is suggested.  
The first assumption is that by addressing the symptoms of cost and time overruns, 
projects will be successfully delivered. This leads to ever tighter enforcement of 
prescribed methods and gateway processes in the hope of imposing control. As this 
situation has endured for over 20 years, it is legitimate to ask why both governments 
have not learned from experience to take a wider perspective on this problem 
domain and seek for alternative solutions. In placing such emphasis on process 
rather than results, they have let down stakeholders who should have been 
recipients of the intended benefits from many projects.  
Assumption number two by governments is that project failure may be treated as a 
puzzle to be solved. Actually every project comprises a complex problem space 
within which many puzzles are intertwined. This requires different thinking to in order 
to generate multiple solutions. Use of legislation to mandate requirements for 
projects shows a lack of real understanding and does not deal with the root causes 
of failure. In particular, it demonstrates lack of focus on the purpose of projects and 
poor appreciation of the changing environment in which they are delivered and 
managed. Policies which emphasise control processes, certifications and technical 
skills, while ignoring a need for management of benefit realisation, will continue to 
produce projects that fail.  
Thirdly, the solutions used by the two governments assume that it is possible to set 
binding budgets and time schedules early in the project lifecycle. However, 
experience shows that, at this stage, there is little certainty or agreement within the 
project domain and many imponderables remain to be explored. If Flyvberg and The 
Green Book are correct in suggesting that budgets are under-estimated in order to 
gain approval, then many projects are set up to fail from the outset, however rigorous 
the controls put in place. Furthermore, the tendency to describe projects in terms of 
their main component (such as ‘IT projects’) is a possible contributory factor to 
project failure. All projects should ultimately benefit the business and support the 
objectives of the organisation. 
The fourth assumption is that projects are planned and executed in stable and 
ordered environments, without turbulence. Rarely, if ever, will these conditions apply 
in practice. We can see therefore that prescriptive methods based on this 
assumption will do nothing to prevent project failure. The environment within which 
the project is planned may well be different from the one in which the project is 
executed. For instance, there may be changes in the political situation, the business 
may redefine its objectives, personnel may change or external factors such as the 
banking sector collapse may impinge. This does not mean that I believe estimating 
budgets, timescales and other requirements to be futile. It does mean that these 
activities must be carried out in a spirit of flexibility, recognising a need for constant 
iteration, and based on as much information as is appropriate and proportionate to 
the project. The concentration on the iron triangle of cost, time and quality targets as 
a measure of success is flawed. Projects should be initiated to create beneficial 
change and meet the business objectives of the organisation. 
When projects are deemed to fail (as inevitably some of them will, even when this 
suggested approach is adopted) there is a need for greater understanding of second 
order causality. If, for example, it is suggested that projects are poorly planned, it 
needs to be uncovered the reasons why this is the case. It is not possible to dissolve 
the problem of project performance without this deepened understanding, and 
increasing levels of control will not address this. Of course, monitoring of projects 
must be done. Appropriate checks and balances are needed when spending public 
money. However, these need to be appropriate, proportional and focussed on project 
purpose.  
I propose that there is a better way forward for project management based on 
benefits realisation and project staff gaining a true understanding of the activities 
required to deliver their projects successfully.  Firstly a greater emphasis on benefits 
management as the keystone of projects (Summers, 2011a). This will clarify the 
purpose and inform the plans of a project. Benefits management needs to be 
embedded within projects so that their whole rationale concentrates on stakeholder 
expectations. Secondly, the way project professionals are educated needs to be 
focused on understanding activities and continuous learning. We need to move away 
from ‘training’ in which a trainer tells delegates the ‘right way’ to deliver projects. The 
current five-day training courses leading to certifications only serve to create a false 
sense of security within organisations. The author believes that a deeper 
understanding of the nature of projects and the activities required is essential to 
improve project performance to ensure the delivery of beneficial change. Thirdly, 
formation of Communities of Practice to encourage collaborative learning, both within 
and outside an organisation, will assist in the propagation of good practice. The 
emphasis needs to be on understanding and continual development, rather than 
blind confidence in a prescribed method that may have worked well in a different 
project within a different environment. An action research project implementing such 
an approach has been undertaken by the author in a UK local government 
organisation (Summers, 2011b) and proved to be successful. The performance of 
project delivery improved with greater ROI and an ability to stay within project 
constraints, further details of this research will be published in further papers.   
As a profession a greater understanding of project performance and resource 
constraints rather than setting those constraints as targets to be achieved will ensure 
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